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INTRODUCTION

Customary international law ("CIL") forms the foundation of
international law.' According to Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, international custom is "evidence of a
general practice accepted as law." 2 CIL is regarded as "the oldest and the
original source of international law." 3 Its formulation is simple enough:
* Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law; B.A., Washington University
(St. Louis); J.D., Harvard Law School.
I As Professor Henkin stated: "The core of traditional international law and its principal
assumptions and foundations have been unwritten 'customary law,' made over time by
widespread practice of governments acting from a sense of legal obligation." Louis HENKIN,
How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 33 (2d ed. 1979); see also HANS
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 438 (Robert W. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1966)
("Custom is the older and the original source of international law, of particular as well as of
general international law.").
2Statute of the Int'l Court of Justice, art. 38, para. (1)(b), http://www.icj4
2 2
cij .org/documents/?p l= &p = .
3 HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS MATERIALS AND
TEXT 232 (4th ed. 1994) (quoting I OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26 (H.
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CIL "results from the general and consistent practice of states followed
by them from a sense of legal obligation." 4 One of the early, influential
commentators described CIL as "[c]ertain rules and customs,
consecrated by long usage and observed by Nations as a sort of
law,
5
constitute the customary Law of Nations, or internationalcustom."
CIL has two components: it must (1) be followed as a general
practice-states adhere to the general practice because they believe they
have a legal obligation to do so-(an objective element), and (2) be
accepted as law.6 The second of these components is viewed as a
subjective or psychological element, known as opiniojuris.7 In sum, the
widely accepted view among scholars is that CIL is the product of
implicit state consent, and CIL rules "form because states engage in or
acquiesce in particular practices and eventually recognize them as
obligatory." 8
Despite centuries of study and reflection, commentators still
struggle with identifying how CIL originated and developed. An
influential observer once noted that the development of CIL is shrouded
in "mystery and illogic." 9 Part of the problem undoubtedly results from
Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955)); see also MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 42 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter "JANIS INTRO"] (noting that until the
1900s, CIL was the principal form of international law); Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati,
Withdrawingfrom InternationalCustom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 208 (2010).
4 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES,
§
102(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987); see also J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary
InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449, 499 (2000) ("The modem paradigm of customary
international legal theory can be stated simply as follows: CIL is formed by the general and
consistent practices of states accepted by them as law. CIL binds all states. New members of
the international community of states are bound by existing customary law. However, an
existing state is not bound by emerging customary law if it persistently objects.").
5EMMERICH DE VA-rEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
LAW APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS 8

(Charles G. Fenwick trans., Carnegie Inst. of Wash. 1916) (1758) (emphasis original). "In
19th century, governments, particularly the United States government, viewed Vattel's treatise
as the primary authority on the law of nations." Kelly, supra note 4, at 510.
6 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 16 (3d
ed. 2010); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
1113, 1116 (1999); see also STEINER ET AL., supra note 3, at 240 (describing a view of CIL
that includes four criteria: "(1) 'concordant practice' by a number of states relating to a
particular situation; (2) continuation of that practice over a 'considerable period of time'; (3) a
conception that the practice is required by or consistent with international law; and (4) general
acquiescence in that practice by other states.").
7 BEDERMAN, supra note 6, at 17; Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 6, at 1116.
8 JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 77-78
(3d ed. 2010).
9 ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4
(1971).
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the fact that the making of CIL may be "informal, haphazard, not
deliberate, even partly unintentional and fortuitous."' 0 It is likely that the
origins of particular principles of CIL were not contemporaneously
recorded, and only became recorded after long-standing usage. Under
such circumstances, the historical record may not reflect when a custom
began or which ruler initiated the custom.
One of the oldest rules of CIL illustrates this situation. Rulers of
states have, for the most part, abided for centuries by the principle that
foreign diplomats must be protected by the ruler of the country in which
they are stationed-the principle of diplomatic immunity." The genesis
of this rule is not entirely known. The most plausible explanation may be
that "some particular powerful prince early asserted sovereign or
diplomatic immunity, and his lawyers provided conceptual underpinning
for it.'

2

This may be as far as scholarship can go in tracing the source.

But again, what is missing from this narrative are several facts, such as:
(1) the time when this occurred; (2) the identity of the ruler; (3) the
willingness or unwillingness of other rulers to abide by this principle;
and (4) the amount of time it took for this custom to rise to the level of
CIL.
These missing facts are the unknowns. This observation by
Professor Henkin, however, does state certain (or, at least, highly
plausible) knowns. In the beginning, there must have been a ruler with
sufficient power to impose and enforce this principle. From there, it is
likely that there were a variety of responses from other rulers. Some
weaker rulers must have acquiesced because they were unable to resist
pressure from the powerful ruler, while other weaker rulers refused to
honor the rule and were punished. Other rulers may have adopted the
rule because it also served their self-interest. These responses may not
have been mutually exclusive. For example, a weaker ruler may have
acquiesced to diplomatic immunity not out of weakness, but because it
served her or his interest.
Along these lines, the development of CIL may be described in the
following manner:

10HENKIN, supra note I, at 34.
"See, e.g., Respublica v. De Longchamps, I U.S. (I Dal.) 111, 116 (Pa. Oyer &
Terminer, 1784) ("[The assault on a French consul] is an infraction of the law of Nations ....
The person of a public minister is sacred and inviolable. Whoever offers any violence to him,
not only affronts the Sovereign he represents, but also hurts the common safety and well being
of nations; he is guilty of a crime against the whole world.").
12HENKIN, supra note 1, at 35.
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[W]hen one examines the emergence of such universally applicable customary
rules and principles as those relating to diplomatic immunities, the prohibition
of piracy and privateering, and sovereign rights over the continental shelf, it is
impossible to show that every State positively consented to the emergence of
the rule in question. Yet it is virtually unanimously accepted that these rules
3
have come to bind all States.'
The real nature of the process by which these customary rules emerged
seems to be more along the following lines. Some States actively created the
practice, either by initiating it or by imitating it, and others, who were directly
affected by the (express or implied) claims in question, by acquiescing in them.
This initiation, imitation and acquiescence may plausibly be described in terms
of will. But others still, who were not directly affected, sat by and14 did nothing,
and in due course found themselves bound by the emerging rule.

What underlies this discussion is the fact that power was crucial to
the initiation of the custom. Some ruler necessarily had to possess
sufficient power to impose or influence the development of the law. 5
[lit is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than
others and that their activities should be regarded as of greater significance.
This is reflected in international law so that custom may be created by a few
states, provided those states are intimately connected with the issue at hand,
whether because of their wealth and power or because of their special
relationship with the subject-matter of the practice, as for example maritime
nations and sea law. Law cannot 6be divorced from politics or power and this is
one instance of that proposition.1

Power expresses itself in a number of ways.
More specifically, we can quite easily identify a list of power resources
potentially relevant to the development of customary international law: (1)
issue-specific power, for example in terms of military technology where the
United States has the clear capacity to shape how wars can be fought; (2) what

'3 INT'L L. ASS'N, COMM. ON FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT'L LAW,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY

INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2000) [hereinafter ILA REPORT], available at http://www.ilahq.org/download.cfm/docid/A709CDEB-92D6-4CFA-A61 C4CA30217F376.
14Maurice H. Mendelson, The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272
COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INT'L LAW 155, 255-256 (1998)

(emphasis original).
15This article's use of the term "power" is borrowed from Professor Byers, who
describes power as "the ability, either directly or indirectly, to control or significantly
influence how actors - in this case States - behave." MICHAEL BYERS, CUSTOM, POWER AND
THE POWER OF RULES: INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

5 (1999). Two common sources of national power are military strength and wealth. Id.
16MALCOLM N. SHAW QC, INTERNATIONAL LAW 79 (6th ed. 2008).
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one might call the power of the critical moment and the capacity both to act
and to argue in a manner that can help crystallize or catalyze the emergence of
a new customary norm... ; (3) institutional power, relevant because of the
close linkages that exist between custom and treaty and the ever increasing role
of institutional and multilateral forums in norm development; (4) the power to
shape the context or background against which customary norms emerge ... ;
or the capacity of the United States to navigate successfully within
transnational civil society and to exploit the role of civil society in norm
development to its own advantages; and (5) the power over the complex
processes of coercive socialization by which weaker actors in the system come
to accept and to internalize norms originating elsewhere in the system.
Coercive socialization represents a political reality that has always threatened
7
to destabilize or dilute the formal concept of consent in international law.'

This article focuses on one particular form of power in the
development of CIL, and suggests that it may be the historically most
important and influential factor: naval power. As stated by Professor
D.P. O'Connell in his classic work, The Influence of Law on Sea Power:

"[S]ea power can express and sustain legal decisions that could not be
represented even remotely credibly in any other way; and it has revealed
of navies to manifest the concept of law and order
the peculiar capacity
18
nations."
among
He added: "[A]nd since navies, alone of the armed services, operate
essentially in an international environment their connection with
international law has always been obvious.' 9 Throughout history, the
shape of CIL has been determined, or at least heavily influenced, by the
ruler or state with the most powerful navy.
As a historical fact, the great body of customary international law was made by
remarkably few States. Only the States with navies - perhaps 3 or 4 - made
most of the law of the sea. Military power, exercised on land and sea, shaped
the customary law of war and, to a large degree, the customary rules on
territorial rights and principles of State responsibility. 'Gunboat diplomacy'
was only the most obvious form of coercive law-making.2°

17See

Andrew Hurrell, Comments on Chapter Ten and Eleven, in UNITED STATES

HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 352, 352-53 (Michael Byers

& Georg Nolte eds., 2003) [hereinafter "U.S. HEGEMONY"].
18D.P. O'CONNELL, THE INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 1 (1975).

19Id. In this article, naval or sea power will be defined as "force and threat of force on
the oceans. It is usually embodied in a national navy composed of vessels most of which are
armed and capable of striking at other ocean craft and at targets on land" and in the air. MARK
W. JANIS, SEA POWER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA xiii (1976) [hereinafter JANIS SEA POWER].
20 Oscar Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN
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Professor O'Connell noted this theme:
The law has never been static. Its pliable character has meant that it has been
made to serve the purposes of sea power, and so has become a weapon in the
naval armoury. Just how it has played this role has depended on the issues that
occasioned resort to naval force, but it has always been prominent in giving
form and character to the issues as well as in influencing the conduct of those
who have sought their resolution. 1

CIL and naval power are intertwined to the point that it may not be
possible to draw a boundary between them. "Just as strategic objectives
influenced what the law had to say, so the law, if it could be made to
prevail, influenced the means of attaining those objectives. ,22
Despite the relationship between naval power and CIL, only a
minority of international law professors in the United States (and
perhaps elsewhere) appear to demonstrate interest in, or examination of,
the subject.23 There also appears to be little interest in explaining this
relationship to students. A rough survey of the indices of the leading
casebooks on International Law reveals no mention of "Navy" or "Naval
Power. ' 24 Perhaps naval power does not merit its own mention in an
index, but references to "Navy" or "Naval Power" are also missing from
the sub-listings under "Law of the sea" in the indices.25 This article
contends that the relationship of naval power and CIL merits continued
examination, and attempts to re-introduce the study of the role of naval
power in the development of CIL and to show how it may influence
emerging legal norms.
Part II of this article begins with a brief summary of the law of the
sea during the period of European colonization (and before), and the
legal clashes between the ocean trading European nations. 26 At that time
and "[u]ntil the twentieth century, almost all of the law of the sea

HONOUR OF KRZYSZTOF SKUBISZEWSKI 531, 536-37
21 O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 16.
22
23
24

(Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996).

1d. at 17.
One notable exception is Professor Janis. See JANIS SEA POWER, supra note 19.
See, e.g., BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 1156 (4th ed. 2003); LORI

FISLER DAMROSCH & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
1524 (6th ed. 2014); MARK WESTON JANIS & JOHN E. NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES

AND COMMENTARY
1168 (5th ed. 2014).
25
CARTER ET AL., supra note 24; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24; JANIS &
NOYES, supra note 24.
26 This article uses the terms "law of the sea" and "maritime law" interchangeably.
Even
though they are not identical in meaning, any difference in meaning is not material for
purposes of this article.
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consisted of customary law that was premised on freedom of the sea., 27
The open and highly contentious question that was unresolved as the
European powers aggressively opened and pursued trade with Asia and
the Americas in the 16th and 17th centuries was whether, or to what
extent, a state could claim exclusive jurisdiction over the oceans and
restrict the navigation rights of other states. Much of today's law on this
issue is traceable to the work of Hugo Grotius, whose role is also
examined in Part II. Part III discusses the role of naval power through
the period of European colonization and the post-colonial period, and the
dispositive role it played in settling unresolved legal issues. The navies
of Portugal, Spain, Holland, and England shaped the development of the
law during this era of colonialism, and, as the article jumps to the postWWII era, the role of the United States Navy will emerge. Part IV
examines why naval power is unique in its power and ability to shape
and influence customary international law. Navies can act (lawfully) in
ways that other military branches cannot, and powerful navies operate,
for the most part, in international waters. Thus, naval operations and
international law are, to a large extent, inseparable.
There are emerging legal norms in human rights law, and though it
may seem counter-intuitive to discuss naval power in this context, this
article asserts that the two are linked. In particular, Part V examines the
relationship between naval power and the right to use force to address
humanitarian crises. Contemporary international law prohibits use of
force by states, except in situations where the U.N. Security Council
authorizes use of force or in cases of self-defense. There is, however,
recognition that use of force may be legal in order to address or avert
catastrophic humanitarian crises. There has also been recent discussion
whether states have a responsibility to protect populations from grave
violations of international law such as genocide. In such situations, if
states are to act in response to such crises, naval power will be necessary
to address or avert them. In this sense, naval power will play a crucial
role in determining whether international law develops to the point
where the responsibility to protect against humanitarian disasters
becomes widely-accepted law. Part VI concludes this article. In doing
so, this article will also touch upon instances in which naval power has
been used to violate international law or norms, and instances in which it
has been ineffective in the face of violations of international law.

27CARTER ET AL., supra note 24, at 836.
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A BRIEF SUMMARY OF MARITIME LAW DURING THE PERIOD OF
EUROPEAN COLONIZATION (AND BEFORE)

Maritime law refers to "the entire body of laws, rules, legal
concepts and processes that relate to the use of marine resources, ocean
commerce, and navigation. '28 Maritime law arose out of the practical
needs of the first merchants who set sail from their shores to engage in
commerce. 29 Given its origins and purpose, maritime law is inherently
international in nature. 30 Indeed, maritime law is one of the earliest

forms of international law and may be the quintessential international
law. 3 1 Early forms of maritime law are found in the Code of Hammurabi
from around 1800 B.C.32 The Phoenicians, and later the island of
Rhodes, dominated maritime activity and law, and Rhodes is reputed to

have developed the Rhodian Sea Code around 900 B.C. (although there
is considerable dispute as to whether Rhodes did in fact develop such a
code).33 The imperial Romans adopted and further developed the
maritime law of the ancient Greeks, and this law became part of the Jus

28

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM,

I ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, PRACTITIONER

TREATISE SERIES 2 (4th ed. 2004). Although commonly used as synonyms, admiralty law is
distinct from maritime law in that admiralty law is about the law of ships and shipping. Id. at
1. This article refers to maritime law, or law of the sea, because of its wider scope. See id.
29Id. at 2. A 19th century American scholar described maritime law's relationship to

commerce in the following manner:
Commerce naturally and necessarily followed upon navigation. To regulate the
multiform transactions of the former, and to encourage the latter, soon required the
attention of the early commercial States. Maritime laws were adopted, appropriate
to the limited wants of an infant trade, but containing nevertheless the elements of
the expanded system, that now comprehends the commerce of the world, and
prescribes the rule of decision, in all contested cases arising out of it.
HENRY FLANDERS, A TREATISE ON MARITIME LAW 3 (Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1852);
see also GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 1I (1957)

("Maritime law was secreted in the interstices of business practice. It arose and exists to deal
with problems that call for legal solution, arising out of the conduct of the sea transport
industry ....).
30SCHOENBAUM, supra note 28, at 2. Schoenbaum adds, "Although its rules are a part of
the internal legal order of each country and, consequently, important national differences
persist, the essential concepts and institutions of maritime law are remarkably similar all over
the world." Id.
31See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at 216 ("Long the most important international
jurisdiction and long, too, one of the most elaborate parts of international law in general has
been the law of the sea.").
32 SCHOENBAUM, supra note 28, at 3 (provisions relating to marine collisions and ship
leasing).
33Id. at 3-5; see also JOSHUA S. FORCE & STEVEN FRIEDELL,

ADMIRALTY § 3 (LexisNexis 2015).

I BENEDICT ON
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Gentium, the law governing all within the Roman Empire. 34 Following
the fall of the Western Roman Empire, the Italian city-states (starting
around the year 1000) dominated maritime activity in the Mediterranean
and further developed the Roman maritime law. 35 In the latter part of the
13th century, trade between Aquitaine, England and Flanders resulted in
the Rolls of Oleron, the most important and influential of the medieval
sea codes, which was derived from Roman and Italian sources. 3 6 "[T]he
Rolls became the basis of the common maritime law of the North Sea
and Atlantic Ocean", and also served as the chief early authority for the
English Admiralty. 37 The Maritime Court in Barcelona produced the
Libro del Consulat del Mar, which was first printed in 1494, and the
court provided the model for the Admiralty of England. 38 After gaining
its independence, the United States' maritime laws were influenced (but
not restricted) by England's experience, and the United States "received"
the traditional body of maritime law (subject, of course, to its particular
needs and circumstances). 39 It is the 17th century, however, that deserves
particular emphasis.
A.

The Influence of Hugo Grotius

The name Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) is undoubtedly familiar to
anyone with even a casual interest in international law. Some have
described him as the founder of modern international law.
In the seventeenth century, the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius argued that the law

of nations also established legal rules that bound the sovereign states of
Europe, then just emerging from medieval society, in their relations with one
another. Grotius' classic of 1625, The Law of War and Peace, is widely
acknowledged, more than any other work, as founding the modem discipline
of the law of nations, a subject that, in 1789, the English philosopher Jeremy
Bentham renamed as "international law.Ao
More modestly, he has been described as "the best known of an
important school of international jurists guided by the philosophy of
34SCHOENBAUM,

supra note 28, at 4, 7.

35
36

d. at 7.
1d. at9.
37
1d. at 9-10.
38 SCHOENBAUM,

supra note 28, at 1I; see also BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY, supra note

33, § 9.

39See SCHOENBAUM, supra note 28, at 16-18; see also GUSTAVUS H. ROBINSON,

HANDBOOK OF ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 7-13 (1939).

40 JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at 1.
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41

natural law.,
For purposes of this article, Grotius plays a key role because he,
probably more than anyone else, is credited with establishing the
customary international legal principle of freedom of the high seas. To
put this into context, it is necessary to briefly examine the trade
competition between Holland, on the one hand, and Portugal and Spain,
on the other, during the 16th and 17th centuries.
In the 16th century, Portugal and Spain began highly lucrative trade
with and via Asia, and by the end of that century, the united SpanishPortuguese Empire dominated European trade with Asia.4 2 Vast amounts
43
of silk, gold, silver, porcelain, and spices flowed between the regions.
This Asian trade route also generated spectacular profits for Spain from
silver mined in Latin America.44 In 1570, China suffered a financial
crisis which forced the ruler to decree that all taxes must be paid in
silver, but there was not enough silver to meet demand, so prices
skyrocketed.45 The solution to China's financial crisis and silver
shortage was a Spanish-controlled silver mine in the Andes Mountains.46
For more than a century [after 1571], [Spanish] galleons shipped around 150
tons of silver a year across the Pacific from Mexico to Manila where it was
traded for gold, silks and ceramics from China. Similarly large amounts of
silver travelled eastwards from Potosi [in the Andes], via Europe. The price of
silver in China - as measured against gold - was double that in Europe. Simply
by shipping Andean silver to China, exchanging it for gold and selling that
gold in Europe, the Spanish Empire was able to make vast profits - and pay for
its wars in Europe. At the same time the European elite rapidly developed a
taste for the luxuries of Chinese silk and porcelain.47

The profits generated by the Spanish-Portuguese traders
understandably attracted the attention of the Dutch. The Portuguese and
Spanish argued, however, that they had exclusive rights to trade in Asia
41DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at xxi. By any measure, Grotius lived an
atypical life. He was born into a powerful family, graduated from college at the age of 1I, was
sent to meet the King of France at the age of 15, and became a barrister. BILL HAYTON, THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA: THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ASIA 38 (2014). For the last ten years of
his life, he was the ambassador of Sweden in Paris. DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at

xxi.

42 HAYTON, supra note 41, at 35-36.
41 Id. at 35.
44Id.
45 id.

HAYTON, supra note 41, at 35.
47 Id.
46
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and navigate the routes because they had discovered the sailing routes to
it. 48 The matter came to a head in 1603 when the Spanish ship, the Santa
Catarina, was attacked and seized by Dutch ships owned by the
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie ("VOC") in the region that is
today Singapore. ' 49 The VOC was the Dutch East India Company, an
arm of the Dutch state, licensed to pursue trade in Asia and contest
Portugal's claims to exclusive rights.5 0 When the cargo of the Santa
Catarinawas auctioned off in the Netherlands,
it generated 3.5 million
5
guilders-half of the total capital of the VOC.

1

In order to provide legal legitimacy and authority to its claim that it
had the right to navigate the seas in Asia, the VOC hired Grotius in
1604.52 In contrast to Portugal's argument that it had the right to decide
who could sail the seas in its domain, Grotius argued that the sea, like
the air, could not be occupied by any one power and was therefore free
for all states to use.53 These arguments were designed to "defend the
right of the VOC to sign contracts with Asian rulers. Grotius [later
argued] that these contracts could legitimately exclude everyone else and
justify the use of force against anyone who tried to impede shipping or
renege on contracts., 54 Grotius' arguments on behalf of the VOC
became public when they were published anonymously in Mare Liberum
(The Free Sea).55
[l]n Mare Liberum, Grotius advanced what became a widely accepted

fundamental principle: that the high seas, that is, oceans apart from narrow
coastal zones, should be open to the ships of all states, an argument he based
on the "most specific and unimpeachable axiom of the Law of Nations, called
a primary rule or first principle, the spirit of which is self-evident and
immutable, to56wit: Every nation is free to travel to every other nation, and to
trade with it."

48 Id. at

36; DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at xxi-xxii.

49 HAYTON, supra note
50 Id. at 36.

41, at 37.

5'
52

Id. at 37.
1d. at 38.
53 HAYTON, supra note 41, at 38.
54 Id.

In his own colorful way, Hayton has a less than charitable view of Grotius, calling
him a "spin doctor" for Dutch interests, and adding: "Grotius was a lobbyist for the VOC and
a determined advocate of Dutch commercial and political rights. He chose his arguments to
suit the occasion, misconstrued the positions of others and relied on shaky references.
Nonetheless, his writings have had a lasting impact." Id. at 38-39.
55 Id. at 38. Grotius was 26 years old at the time of publication of Mare Liberurn.
56 JANIS

INTRO, supra note 3, at 216 (quoting HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE
SEAS 7 (Magoffin trans. 1916) (1609)).
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One recent news article observed that "[o]ver the following
centuries [Mare Liberum] was used by global powers as justification to
sail merchant vessels where they liked, often with gunboats sailing
alongside to enforce their authority., 57 Grotius' publication was
perfectly suited to support Dutch interests because the Dutch became the
dominant force in the South China Sea for most of the 17th century, as
traders and middlemen in voyages between Asian destinations. With
superior naval power the Dutch forced the Portuguese out of the
Japanese silver trade and most of the spice ports.58
Despite Mare Liberum and the rise of the Dutch navy, the issue
whether navigation of the high seas was open to all or could be restricted
by states remained an open issue. A leading English lawyer, John Selden
(1584-1654) opposed Grotius' arguments for open seas and published a
defense of closed or restricted seas called Mare Clausum Sive De
Dominio Maris (Mare Clausum) in 1635.59 King James I hired Selden to
rebut the open sea argument because he strongly objected to Dutch
fishing fleets sailing along the Scottish and English coasts to harvest the
annual migration of herring. 60 Selden argued that states had the right to
restrict access and claim specific areas of the high seas as sovereign
territory; this view of the law was designed to protect the English herring
fishermen. 6'
Selden was clearly in favour of drawing imaginary lines through waves but
ultimately even Grotius conceded that bays, gulfs and straits could be
possessed. However, although they both concluded that it was possible and
right to draw lines through the sea, they disagreed about exactly where these
lines should be drawn. By the end of the seventeenth century, European states
had reached a compromise, sometimes called the 'cannon shot' rule, allowing
a country to control the waters up to three or four nautical miles from its coast
[-the distance a cannon ball could fly from a coastal battery].62

57Maritime Power: Your Rules or Mine?, ECONOMIST (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21631792-trade-depends-order-sea-keepingit-far-straightforward-your-rules-or.
58
HAYTON, supranote 41, at 41.
59DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at xxi.
60HAYTON, supranote 41, at 39.
61 Id. at 40; see also DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at xxi-xxii ("The rejection
of the freedom of the seas by Selden corresponded to the interests of England, at that time
navally inferior to Holland. The work of Grotius served to vindicate the interests of the

Netherlands as a rising maritime and colonial power not only against England, but also against
Spain and Portugal, states which claimed the right to control navigation on distant oceans and
trade with the East Indies.").
62 HAYTON, supra note 41, at 40.
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As matters stood in the 17th century, it appears that England and
Selden were on the wrong side of history, and England's attempt to
impose a closed sea regime on Holland failed.63 Tides turned, however,
and England came to a different view of the issue. England emerged as
the globe's dominant naval power, and it saw that its national interest
was best served by open seas where its navy could operate without
interference. 64 England, then, made sure that open seas became
customary international law.65
63 Id.

64id.
65 DAMROSCH

& MURPHY, supra note 24, at xxi. The law of the sea is now generally

governed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which came into
effect on November 16, 1994. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, NAVAL WARFARE PUBLICATION 1-14M,
THE COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 1-1 (July 2007)
[hereinafter "NWP 1-14M"]; see generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea-Final Act, U.N. Doc. E.83.V.5 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter "UNCLOS"], available at
http://www.un.org/depts/los/conventionagreements/convention-overview-convention.htm.
UNCLOS was the result of the Third United Nations Conference on the law of the sea. See
NWP 1-14M, supra note 65, at 1-1. The need for this conference was precipitated by the
emergence of new concepts such as claims to exclusive economic zones, which expanded the
jurisdictional claims of littoral states. Id. The United States is not a party to UNCLOS. Id. The
United States, however, does view the navigation and overflight provisions of UNCLOS as an
accurate reflection of customary law, and thus acts in accordance with the Convention, except
for the deep seabed mining provisions. Id.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a
comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing
rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion
that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as
a whole.
The Convention was opened for signature on 10 December 1982 in Montego
Bay, Jamaica. This marked the culmination of more than 14 years of work
involving participation by more than 150 countries representing all regions of the
world, all legal and political systems and the spectrum of socio/economic
development. At the time of its adoption, the Convention embodied in one
instrument traditional rules for the uses of the oceans and at the same time
introduced new legal concepts and regimes and addressed new concerns. The
Convention also provided the framework for further development of specific areas
of the law of the sea.
The Convention entered into force in accordance with its article 308 on 16
November 1994, 12 months after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of
ratification or accession. Today, it is the globally recognized regime dealing with
all matters relating to the law of the sea.
See Overview - Convention and Related Agreements, UNITED NATIONS, DIVISION FOR
2013),
22,
(Aug.
SEA
OF
THE
LAW
THE
AND
AFFAIRS
OCEAN
http://www.un.org/deptsflos/convention-agreements/convention-overview-convention.htm.
* Some of the key features of the Convention include the following: Coastal
States exercise sovereignty over their territorial sea which they have the right to
establish its breadth up to a limit not to exceed 12 nautical miles; foreign
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THE ROLE OF NAVAL POWER IN DEVELOPING CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW

There is a school of thought based on the observation that
"successive hegemons have shaped the foundations of the international
legal system,"-from Spain in the 16th century, Holland in the 17th
century, France in the 18th century, Britain in the 19th century, to the
United States today.66 This theme is amplified by a widespread view of
how CIL is made. Only a few nations participate in the development of
CIL, and (not surprisingly) those few nations are the militarily and
politically powerful nations.6 7
Although all States are equally entitled to participate in the customary process,
in general, it may be easier for more 'powerful' States to behave in ways
which will significantly influence the development, maintenance or change of
customary rules....
Among other things, powerful States generally have large, well-financed
diplomatic corps which are able to follow international developments globally

*

"

"

"

Id.

vessels are allowed "innocent passage" through those waters;
Ships and aircraft of all countries are allowed "transit passage" through straits
used for international navigation; States bordering the straits can regulate
navigational and other aspects of passage; ...
Coastal States have sovereign rights in a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) with respect to natural resources and certain economic activities,
and exercise jurisdiction over marine science research and environmental
protection;...
Coastal States have sovereign rights over the continental shelf (the national area
of the seabed) for exploring and exploiting it; the shelf can extend at least 200
nautical miles from the shore, and more under specified circumstances;...
All States enjoy the traditional freedoms of navigation, overflight, scientific
research and fishing on the high seas; they are obliged to adopt, or cooperate
with other States in adopting, measures to manage and conserve living
resources ....

66Michael Byers, Introduction to U.S. HEGEMONY supra note 17, at 1.
67See Kelly, supra note 4, at 453 ("Few nations participate in the formation of norms

said to be customary. The less powerful nations and voices are ignored."). Other
commentators have expressed similar views:
But it is inescapable that some states are more influential and powerful than others
and that their activities should be regarded as of greater significance. This is
reflected in international law so that custom may be created by a few states,
provided those states are intimately connected with the issue at hand, whether
because of their wealth and power or because of their special relationship with the
subject-matter of the practice, as for example maritime nations and sea law. Law
cannot be divorced from politics or power and this is one instance of that
proposition.
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 68 (5th ed. 2003).
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across a wide spectrum of issues. This enables those States to object, in a
timely fashion, to developments which they perceive as being contrary to their
interests. If more than oral or written objection is required, powerful States
also have greater military, economic and political strength which enables them
to enforce jurisdictional
claims, impose trade sanctions and dampen or divert
68
international criticism.

In light of this view of international law-making, more attention
should be devoted to one particular attribute of power that enable states
to dominate the creation of CIL-naval power.
Power manifests itself in numerous forms, but historically naval
power has played a unique role in the development of CIL. Although it
is difficult to ascribe exact weight to any single factor that determines a
nation's influence when it comes to making international law, the CILmaking states have shared a common attribute-dominant naval power.
It has been a consistent theme over time. According to one prominent
naval historian, the dominant nation in world affairs since the time of the
Romans has been whichever nation commanded naval superiority.69
As Hayton observed: "In each era, the global hegemon-the
Netherlands, then Britain and today the United States-has argued in
favour of freedom of navigation70 and used military force to prevent
others challenging that freedom."
The disagreement between the colonial European powers over
freedom of the seas was not settled by reasoned discussion around a
conference table or in court. It may seem odd today to think of a regime
where the right to sail the seas would be controlled by one country.
Portugal and Spain, however, claimed control over the ocean. 7 1 Their
claims were abandoned due to the superior naval power of first the
Dutch, then the British. The CIL principle of freedom of the seas was
imposed on the Iberian states by England and Holland "whose cannon[s]
shattered Spain's claim to oceanic sovereignty. '72 Similarly, the
difference in opinion between Grotius and Selden was not resolved by
discussion. It was resolved when Great Britain became the dominant
naval power in the world.73
68BYERS, supra note 15, at 37.
69

See BERNARD SEMMEL, LIBERALISM AND NAVAL STRATEGY 3 (1986).
70 HAYTON, supra note 41, at 40.
71

JOHN W. COOGAN, THE END OF NEUTRALITY, THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN AND

MARITIME RIGHTS 1899-1915, at 17 (1981).
72 id.
73Until World War 11, the Royal Navy was the most powerful in the world. The Royal
Navy,

ENCYCLOPAEDIA

BRITANNICA,
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From then on, London's interests were better served by Grotius' arguments
than Selden's. The British Empire was based on the presumed right of
countries-and one country in particular-to trade freely around the world.
Rather than arguing for wider territorial waters to save the herring, Britannia
now argued for narrower ones so that it could rule more of the waves. That
required minimizing other rulers' rights to limit navigation. The Royal Navy
could usually be relied upon to resolve any major disagreements over this point
of legal principle with the application of its own version of the 'cannon shot'
rule.74

Great Britain's motivations were obvious; as the world's greatest
trading nation, it needed to defend access to the empire's far-flung
ports.75 Britain accomplished its goals by using its superior naval
strength to create "an international maritime regime based on the
freedoms of the high seas, freedoms to travel and to fish without coastal
state regulation outside a 3-mile territorial sea.",76 This new era of CIL
was not the product of formal treaties or conventions; these rules,
however, were "remarkably effective [and] respected by most states in
times of peace from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the end
of World War II in 1945." 77
The dominance of the Royal Navy came to an end with the
conclusion of World War II in 1945, and the United States Navy
emerged as the dominant global power. 8 World War II cemented
America's status as the most powerful naval force in the world, and it

http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/511494/The-Royal-Navy (last visited Mar. 30,
2015). Britain's development as an empire between 1714 and 1837 had an important
international and military dimension, based on commerce, sea power and naval dominance.
Kenneth Morgan, Overview: Empire and Sea Power 1714-1834, BRITISH BROADCASTING
CORP.

(Feb.

17,

2011),

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire-seapower/overview-empire-seapower1O
.shtml.
74
HAYTON, supra note 4 1, at 40.
75See
Trading Routes in Colonial Era, COLONIALISM AND EMPIRES,
http://www.britishempire.co.uk/article/worldtradingroutesmap.htm (last visited July 14, 2015)
(depicting the global trade routes of Great Britain during the turn of the 2 0 th century).
76 JANIS SEA POWER, supra note 19, at xiii-xiv.
77 Id. As a result, for over a century, civil and military vessels could sail freely
on seas
covering some 70 percent of the earth's surface. Only within a narrow three mile buffer-the
territorial sea-did coastal states impose some legal limits on the mobility of naval forces. Id.;
see also Morgan, supra note 73, at 5 ("British oceanic enterprise provided the shipping,
commerce, settlers and entrepreneurs that held these far-flung territories together. In the
Indian Ocean, the English India Company dominated trade with India, Southeast Asia and
China .... Trade was backed by naval power and by efficient handling of private and public
credit, including substantial borrowing via the Bank of England.").
78 See JANIS SEA POWER, supra note 19, at xiv.
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has remained the largest and most powerful naval force since then.7 9 The
United States wasted little time in exercising its new role as the world's
naval superpower after the end of World War II in August 1945. This
(peaceful) exercise of naval power was demonstrated one month later in
September 1945, when President Truman issued a proclamation
resources from 12
extending the United States' control over its seabed
80
nautical miles to the edge of the continental shelf.
With the stroke of a pen, President Truman upended wellestablished CIL regarding jurisdiction over coastal waters. "At the time
it was made, this claim was inconsistent with pre-existing international
79See
The
United
States
Navy,
ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA
(last
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/6 17712/The-United-States-Navy-USN
visited Sept. 2, 2015) [hereinafter "The United States Navy"]; see also HAYTON, supra note
41, at 219 (noting that China has the second-largest naval fleet and military budget behind
only the United States).
Though it did not become the dominant naval power until 1945, America
American
established itself as a global naval power before the Civil War. The
imperial project in Asia began with Commodore Perry's exemplary display of
gunboat diplomacy in Tokyo harbour in 1853: plenty of gunpowder but no
casualties. Rather than resist, as the Qing court had done, the Japanese elite
embraced modernisation and, within half a century, were to join in the
dismemberment of China, American success in Japan led to greater ambitions. In
1890, the president of the US Naval War College, Alfred Mahan, published The
Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783-analysing Britain's success in
creating a global empire. Mahan argued that for the United States to prosper, it
needed to secure new markets abroad and protect trade routes to them through a
network of naval bases. His argument resonated with a new generation of
politicians. The opportunity came eight years later. By the end of the SpanishAmerican War, the US had truly become a Pacific power, annexing the Phillipines,
Hawaii and Guam.
Id. at 49.
80 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.
12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945). The Truman
Proclamation declared in pertinent part:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRUMAN, President of the United States of
America, do hereby proclaim the following policy of the United States of America
with respect to the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental
shelf. Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently utilizing its
natural resources, the Government of the United States regards the natural
resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas
but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United
States, subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continental shelf
extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the
boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in
accordance with equitable principles. The character as high seas of the water above
the continental shelf and the right to their free and unimpaired navigation are in no
way thus affected.
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law." 81 Furthermore, "[n]o State had ever made a general claim to
control over all of the seabed resources of its continental shelf beyond
twelve nautical miles, nor had anything approaching such a claim
appeared in any treaty." 82 What was the purpose of this proclamation? 83
It
was to assert control over seabed resources, particularly offshore oil.
Why was the United States able to unilaterally assert such a right?
Because it was the world's dominant naval power.
The Truman Proclamation follows the hypothesis that CIL
principles were formed by powerful rulers who established a practice
that was then adopted by other rules. Just as England and the Royal
Navy used their dominance to ensure that freedom of the high seas
became CIL, the United States used its navy to ensure that control of
offshore resources became CIL.84 In both instances, scores of weaker
countries enthusiastically embraced the new CIL.85
Yet notwithstanding the initial inconsistency between the United States' claim
and pre-existing international law, the claim rapidly acquired the status of
customary international law as other States followed the lead of the United
States and made similar claims to jurisdiction over their own continental
shelves....
Why was the Truman Proclamation so successful in promoting the
development of a rule of customary international law? One important factor
was undoubtedly the position of the United States. In 1945 the United States
was by far the world's most powerful State, having
emerged victorious and
86
relatively unscathed from the Second World War.

The passage of the Truman Proclamation legitimized and provided
87
cover for other, even weaker, littoral states to exercise the same right.
As a result, other countries advantageously expanded their jurisdiction
further and further into their coastal waters. 88 While these other nations
81
82

BYERS, supra note 15, at 91.
Id.

83See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at xiv. (The Truman Proclamation "asserted United
States ownership of the oil and gas beneath the offshore continental shelf, an underwater

plateau extending, in many places, hundreds of miles out to sea."). To put the Proclamation
into historical context, the Truman administration was concerned that the United States was
"about to become a net importer of oil, and its dependence on foreign sources of petroleum
would swell in the years ahead." DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL,
MONEY & POWER 407 (1991).
84 See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at 21 6-17.
85 See id.; see also BYERS, supra note 15, at 91.
86 BYERS, supra note 15, at 91-92.
87
See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3,at 216-17.
88See id.
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may not have been powerful enough to establish the practice themselves,
the powerful nation's proclamation opened the door for other nations to
follow in its wake.89
The law of the sea is the creature of international order, reflecting patterns
of compromise and consensus, insofar as they exist, among the competing and
complementary interests of states. Since security interests are vital to every
country, it is only reasonable to expect that states will consider sea power
when devising ocean policy. It would be remarkable if a workable legal order
for the oceans did not accommodate national naval interests.
Sea power influences the development of the law of the sea not only by
imposing the need to reconcile naval interests in international negotiations, but
when naval force is used to advance national claims to international law of the
sea. The law of the sea can be developed both by convention and by custom.
Outside of the development of the law of the sea in the Third United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference and in other diplomatic meetings, states attempt to
develop customary law of the sea, making claims and counterclaims in their
actual maritime
practice. Navies often have a role in this process of customary
90
law making.

The Truman Proclamation is one notable illustration of how naval
power has been especially effective and necessary in forming CIL.
States are rightly concerned about the law of the sea; it raises issues of
territorial sovereignty, control of natural resources, and access to trading
routes. These issues directly affect national prestige, security, commerce,
and wealth. Naturally, states strive to assert maximum self-interest in
staking out their positions on such issues. 9' Against such interests, law
assumes a lesser priority (assuming there is governing law in the first
place).92 At the time he wrote his book, Professor O'Connell made this
observation of the state of the law of the sea:
Government departments everywhere have produced instant experts on the law
of the sea, usually without legal training, whose anxiety appears to be to 'beat
the gun' by staking out a claim in advance of the [Law of the Sea] conference
so as to present other delegations with afait accompli. No element of opinio
juris is discernible in this activity; no consideration is given to the elements of
effectiveness and consent which are the concomitants of customary law; and,
because it becomes impossible to raise the level of analysis above the mere
anecdotal, the notion of State practice has become devoid of any significant
89See ILA Report, supra note 3, at 39.
90 JANIS SEA POWER, supra note 19, at xvii.
9'See A.O. Sykes, InternationalLaw, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 764
(Polinsky
& Shavell, eds. 2007).
92
See O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 12-13.
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content.ln this intellectual morass, where opinions and views are a substitute
for law, the occasions for controversy, dispute and violence become ever more
numerous and frequent. The
law of the sea has thus become the stimulus to sea
93
power and not its restraint.

In situations where there is no governing law or where competing
claims are made without principled legal bases, the resolution of issues
will ultimately be decided by the naval power that is able to advance and
establish the governing regime. 94 In this way, "[s]tates may use their
navies to demonstrate and enforce their perceptions of the proper law of
the sea. If such naval operations are consistent, effective, and accepted,
customary law of the sea may develop." 95
As Professor Janis summed it up: "In the customary process, naval
operations and the exercise of sea power may play a vital role because
naval activities are 96an authoritative and forceful expression of state
interest and policy.

IV.

THE UNIQUE ATTRIBUTES OF NAVAL POWER TO MAKE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Naval power is unique among the forms of military power in its
ability to shape CIL, and much of that uniqueness is due to Grotius'
prevailing argument that the high seas are international waters that are
freely navigable by all navies. 97 Because navies are able to operate with
93

1d. at 13.

94See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at 75.
95
Id.at 75.
96 id. at 76-77. This view was also shared by the Soviet navy. See Scott C. Truver, The
Law of the Sea and the Military Use of the Oceans in 2010, 45 LA. L. REV. 1221, 1233 (1985)
("The Soviet navy has also recognized the possibilities of the use of sea power to influence
foreign leaders and support Moscow's foreign policies. Indeed, Soviet doctrine has accepted
the classical concept of seapower ....). Soviet Admiral Gorshkov has written:
Owing to the high mobility and endurance of its combatants, the navy possesses the
capability to vividly demonstrate the economic and military might of a country
beyond its borders during peacetime. This quality is normally used by the political
leadership of the imperialist states to show their readiness for decisive actions, to
deter or suppress the intentions of potential enemies, as well as to support "friendly
states.".. . Consequently, the role of a navy is not limited to the execution of
important missions in armed combat. While representing a formidable force in war,
it has always been an instrument of policy of the imperialist states and an important
support for diplomacy in peacetime owing to its inherent qualities which permit it
to a greater degree than other branches of the armed forces to exert pressure on
potential enemies without the direct employment of weaponry.
Id. (footnote
omitted).
97
See JANIS INTRO, supra note 3, at 216.
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freedom-without interference by other states on the high seas-naval
power possesses advantages and capabilities that land-based military
powers do not. 98 Simply put, navies are able to act in ways that armies
and land-based air forces cannot.
Although all armed forces function, to some extent, as an arm of foreign
policy, there are several advantages to sea power. Its principal advantage is
flexibility. Since naval forces operate in an international medium-the high
seas-they can be moved into an area without the necessity of obtaining
overflight or diplomatic clearances. Another classical advantage of sea power
is its "universality" or "pervasiveness," meaning that the sea permits naval
vessels to reach distant countries independent of nearby bases. Moreover, seabased forces are not subject to host-country employment restrictions, a
problem encountered by United States land-based forces during the 1973
Middle East conflict. Further, the use of ground troops generally signifies
strong resolve and a long-term commitment that tends to escalate rather than
de-escalate a conflict. The decision to use ground forces almost always results
in a violation of the territorial integrity of another nation, whereas naval forces
can remain outside but near territorial waters for long periods, thereby
allowing for much greater flexibility in terms of a final decision to commit the
forces. Finally, naval forces enjoy an important operational advantage since a
significant part of the Navy's support is organic to the combat unit, thus
simplifying communications and logistics. Taken together, these features have
made naval forces, in the words of former Chief of Naval Operations Elmo
Zumwalt, the "relevant factor" in almost all crises that have occurred since
World War 11.99

Returning to Professor O'Connell:
Navies alone afford governments the means of exerting pressure more
vigorous than diplomacy and less dangerous and unpredictable in its results
than other forms of force, because the freedom of the seas makes them locally
available while leaving them uncommitted. They have the right to sail the seas
and the endurance to do so for requisite periods, while land-based forces
cannot present a credible0level of coercion without overstepping the boundaries
of national sovereignty.' 0

He added:
The sea, then, is the only area where armed forces can joust with more or

98See O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 3-4.

99 Dennis R. Neutze, Bluejacket Diplomacy: A JuridicalExaminationof the Use ofNaval
Forces in Support of United States Foreign Policy, 32 JAG J. 81, 85-86 (1982) (footnotes
omitted).
100 O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 3-4.
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less seriousness in order to promote political objectives; the only area where
they can be concentrated, ready for intervention but not overtly threatening to
intervene. An army that crosses a frontier 0represents a use of force altogether
different from a navy that crosses the seas.1

"Blue water" navies, then, are able to sail the globe without
violating territorial sovereignty, have freedom of movement 1°
in2
international waters, and are designed for flexibility in movement.
This is why naval power is so intertwined with international law.
Special attributes and broad options inherent in the use of naval forces have
made them particularly well suited for the purposes of the defense of sea lines
of communication (SLOC) and the projection of power into regions of
importance to the state. Naval units have the capability to respond quickly to
crisis situations and contingencies world-wide with the precise type and
magnitude of force necessary to achieve the stated objective. The naval forces
of the major maritime powers have the capability to apply military power
deftly across the entire spectrum of armed force: from the maintenance of
unobtrusive presence, to the deliberate show of force for political purpose, to
limited war, to general conventional war, to a launch of a strategic nuclear
attack. Naval force, then, is flexible and possesses wide geographical reach. As
Hedley Bull has described these special qualities:
As an instrument of diplomacy, sea power has long been thought to
possess certain classical advantages vis-a-vis land power and, more
recently, air power. The first of these advantages is its flexibility: a naval
force can be sent and withdrawn, and its size and activities varied, with a
higher expectation that it will remain subject to control than is possible
when ground forces are committed. The second is its visibility: by being
seen on the high seas or in foreign ports a navy can convey threats,
provide reassurance, or earn prestige in a way that troops or aircraft in
their home bases cannot do. The third is universality or pervasiveness: the
fact that the seas, by contrast with the land and the air, are an international
medium allows naval vessels to reach distant countries independently of
nearby bases and makes a state possessed of sea power the neighbor of
every other country that is accessible by sea.
Inherent in the peacetime use of navies, however, is the ability to travel
freely upon the oceans of the world. Without the free use of international ocean
space, these special attributes of naval force for the exercise of sea power in
peacetime can provide little benefit to the nation with great power
'0 Id. at 8.
102"Blue

water" navies are ones that can operate in high seas far from their home country,

as opposed to navies whose capabilities are limited to coastal operations. JANIS SEA
supra note 19, at xiii.
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Thus, though it may not be apparent to casual observers, naval
power and international law are, in fact, intertwined and inseparable.
Moreover, naval power has been instrumental in forming and/or
enforcing international law. This fact0 4has been demonstrated throughout
history, and continues to hold force.'
A.

A BriefDescriptionof the UnitedStates Navy

Because naval power occupies such a crucial role in international
law-making and enforcement, this article will briefly describe the status
of the United States Navy. The United States Navy is, by far, the largest
in the world.'0 5
In 2010, then Secretary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, provided this
summary of the status of the U.S. Navy:
"
*

"
*

*

"

The U.S. operates 11 large carriers, all nuclear powered. In terms of size
and striking power, no other country has even one comparable ship.
The U.S. Navy has 10 large-deck amphibious ships that can operate as sea
bases for helicopters and vertical-takeoff jets. No other navy has more than
three, and all of those navies belong to [our] allies or friends. Our Navy can
carry twice as many aircraft at sea as all the rest of the world combined.
The U.S. has 57 nuclear-powered attack and cruise missile submarines again, more than the rest of the world combined.
Seventy-nine Aegis-equipped combatants carry roughly 8,000 verticallaunch missile cells. In terms of total missile firepower, the U.S. arguably
outmatches the next 20 largest navies.
All told, the displacement of the U.S. battle fleet - a proxy for overall fleet
capabilities - exceeds, by one recent estimate, at least the next 13 navies
combined, of which 11 are our allies or partners.
force of its
And, at 202,000 strong, the Marine Corps is the largest military
10 6
kind in the world and exceeds the size of most world armies.

Secretary Gates affirmed that "the United States stands unsurpassed

supra note 96, at 1228-29 (footnote omitted).
104See Schachter, supra note 20, at 536-37.
105Kyle Mizokami, The Five Most-Powerful Navies on the Planet, THE NATIONAL
103 Truver,

INTEREST (June 6, 2014), http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-most-powerful-navies-

the-planet- 10610.
106Robert M. Gates, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Remarks at Navy League Sea-Air-Space
Exposition at the Gaylord Convention Ctr., Nat'l Harbor, Maryland (May 3, 2010), available
=
at http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid l 460.
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on, above, and below the high seas." 10 7 He also noted the historical roots
of the Navy's importance:
But we must always be mindful of why America built and has maintained a
Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard. Indeed, it was an Army general,
Ulysses Grant, who said that "[m]oney expended in a fine navy, not only adds
to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to
our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime." And in fact, this country
learned early on, after years of being bullied and blackmailed on the high seas,
that it must be able to protect trade routes, project power, deter potential
if necessary, strike them on the oceans, in their ports, or on
adversaries, and,
08
their shores.'

The Navy is charged with four missions: (1) Control of the Sea; (2)
Projection of Power Ashore; (3) Strategic Deterrence; and (4) Naval
Presence.' 09
The foreign policy or political use of naval power differs from other
applications of military power in that its use is continuous. Routine naval
activities, or "preventive deployments," contribute in several ways to the
overall American foreign policy goal of conflict avoidance. First, preventive
deployments demonstrate the United States' military and political commitment
to particular states or groups of states. The continuous presence of the Sixth
Fleet in the Mediterranean is an example. Preventive deployments also
demonstrate to foreign governments the capability of U.S. naval forces to act,
if required, in support of our interests. And, naval presence forces confirm, on
a routine basis, our political commitments to others....
107Id.

108Id.

109Neutze, supra note 99, at 83-85.
The first mission, "sea control," is that role historically associated with navies
and still considered the fundamental function of the U.S. Navy. It involves keeping
open sea lanes of communication for U.S. and allied purposes while denying their
use to the enemy....
"Projection of power ashore" describes the attainment of military objectives on
land by the use of Marine Corps amphibious forces. Although this mission is also
largely war-related, the frequent peacetime use of Marine Corps forces to support
foreign policy broadens its political dimension....
The third mission of the Navy, "strategic deterrence," involves the use of naval
forces-principally ballistic missile submarines-to discourage adversaries from
launching a nuclear attack. ...
... The term "naval presence" simply means the use of naval forces short of
war to achieve political objectives. The broad aims of naval presence are to
encourage actions in the best interests of the United States or her allies, and to deter
actions inimical to those interests by projecting a stabilizing influence into an area
of crisis.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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A second type of deployment supporting foreign policy is the "reactive
deployment" in response to a crisis. Such deployments may simply signal
American interest in the outcome of the crisis; alternatively, the presence of
naval forces on scene may be intended to induce a preferred course of
action.' 10

The United States has relied upon its naval power in numerous
instances to advance foreign policy interests.
A study by the Brookings Institution found that the United States employed
its armed forces 215 times for political purposes between 1946 and 1975.
Naval forces participated in 80% of these instances, and more than 100
incidents involved only naval forces. If the period surveyed were narrowed to
include only political uses since 1955, the Navy was involved in nine of every
ten incidents. These figures clearly support President Warren G. Harding's
assessment that "the Navy is rather more than a mere instrumentality of
warfare. It is the right arm of the State Department."' l

The Navy, in one of its Commander's Handbooks, recognizes the
importance of international law and its role.
[l]nternational law is defined as that body of rules that nations consider
binding in their relations with one another. International law derives from the
practice of nations in the international arena and from international
agreements. International law provides stability in international relations and
an expectation that certain acts or omissions will effect predictable
consequences. If one nation violates the law, it may expect that others will
reciprocate. Consequently, failure to comply with international law ordinarily
involves greater political and economic costs than does observance. In short,
nations comply with international law because it is in their interest to do so.
Like most rules of conduct,
international law is in a continual state of
2
development and change." 1

In light of the multi-faceted roles of naval power, it is inaccurate to
view naval power as simply one form of military power to be utilized
when violent force is required (usually when legal processes or
diplomacy fail). It is also an integral arm of foreign policy, and is
uniquely capable of making and enforcing law. Any study of the
development13 of CIL without examination of its role would be
incomplete. 1
'0o/d. at 87-88 (footnotes omitted).
..Id. at 81-82 (footnotes omitted).
112NWP I-14M, supra note 65, at 20.
13 See Truver, supra note 96, at 1226-1228. Truver went on to note:
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THE CONTINUING ROLE OF NAVAL POWER TO SHAPE
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Though it may seem indelicate to discuss matters of force and
violence in academic discussions, it is an inescapable fact that navies
As important as the civil maritime assets are, however, this discussion is
concerned solely with the present and future uses of naval power, especially in the
legal-politico-military context of the future law of the sea. That is, why do states
want navies and what purpose does sea power serve in a "peacetime" environment?
Second, what are the special attributes of sea power which permit states to pursue
their politico-military objectives by relying upon naval force? And finally, what are
the roles of naval power as an instrument of foreign policy in situations short of
war?
The U.S. Navy publication, Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP-l,

provides a clear statement of the importance of sea power to the United States.
America's geographical position, the location of major allies, America's great
dependence on international seabome trade, and the increasing importance of the
oceans as sources of food, energy and minerals offer compelling rationales for the
missions, structure, and size of the U.S. Navy. The central importance of the seas to
continued American prosperity and national security is evident in this excerpt from
NWP-J:

The United States is a maritime nation with only two international frontiers
and thousands of miles of coastline bordering on two of the world's largest
oceans.... Unlike its potential adversaries, the United States is heavily
involved in the interdependent world economy. Should the sea lines of
communication be interdicted for any length of time, the welfare of U.S.
citizens would be radically impaired. The majority of U.S. allies are overseas
and even more dependent [on] free use [of] the seas than we are. The critical
support required by them in time of war is that which can be projected across
the seas. All U.S. international relations, be they economic, political, or
military, are influenced by this heavy dependence on free and unimpeded
passage on the oceans of the world. The dependence on the seas impacts
directly on any consideration of national strategy.
The doctrinal foundation for this statement was expressed at the end of the
nineteenth century in the writings of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, whose
conception of the close relationships among national power, foreign policy, and sea
power provided a cardinal thesis for the use of sea power to further national
objectives. Mahan perceived the sea as "a great highway" or "a wide common"
providing countries having access to it with an easier and cheaper means of
transportation than across land. Using Great Britain as an example and citing the
effective use of the sea for both commercial and military transport which brought
Great Britain tremendous wealth and international prestige, Mahan argued that no
nation that aspired to great power status could ignore the importance of sea power.
Navies, the tools with which to forge great power, had two purposes in Mahan's
scheme. The first was to protect commerce, so that no country could interfere with
the free use of the oceans as an avenue for international trade. The second purpose
was to carry out "aggression" or combat.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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(and all military branches) exist to engage in use of force, if necessary.
This fact is juxtaposed alongside the driving theme and first principle of
international law: Avoidance of use of force. Indeed, in listing the
purposes of the United Nations, the Charter starts:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace. 14

The Charter reinforces this point in Article 2. Paragraph 3 provides:
"All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means
in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered."" 5
Paragraph 4 provides: "All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in' any
other
6
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." 1
The Charter provides only two exceptions to the prohibition of use
of force: (1) use of force is 7authorized if approved by the Security
Council; and (2) self-defense.' 1
In light of these fundamental principles, an air of illegitimacy may
seem to surround the idea of naval power influencing the development
of CIL. The notion that force or the (express or implied) threat of force
is involved in making law runs counter to the aspirations of a world
governed by law. This article contends, however, that naval power has a
legitimate role to play in developing CIL, even when it comes to
advancing human rights law (which may seem counter-intuitive). To
develop this contention, this article looks to the legal and factual events
relating to the bombing of Kosovo by NATO forces in 1999.
The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia resulted in violent
conflict among the various ethnic groups in the region. In particular,
violence escalated between ethnic Serbs and ethnic Albanians. In 1998,
the U.N. Security Council condemned "the excessive and indiscriminate
114U.N.

Charter art. 1, 1.
U.N. Charter art. 2, 3.
16 U.N. Charter art.
2, 4.
117 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 51.
115
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use of force by Serbian security forces and the Yugoslav army" against
the ethnic Albanians.) 18 Despite the violence, the Security Council failed
to authorize the use of force to protect the ethnic Albanians. In early
1999, ethnic Serbian forces killed dozens of ethnic Albanian civilians in
a village in Kosovo." 9 These events led NATO to intervene with force
to end the violence.120 In March 1999, NATO began a bombing
campaign against Serbia with the purpose of protecting the ethnic
Albanians from the ethnic Serbs.' It is important to note that this use of
force was not authorized by the Security Council, and no NATO
member could plausibly claim self-defense. In other words, there was no
legal basis for this use of force under the U.N. Charter. Russia
22
denounced the bombing as a "flagrant violation" of the U.N. Charter.'
The United Kingdom denied Russia's claim, and asserted its justification
for the use of force: "We are in no doubt that NATO is acting within
international law and our legal justification rests upon the accepted
principle that force may be used in extreme circumstances to avert a
' 23
humanitarian catastrophe."'
The problem with Britain's position was that it was arguable
whether the use of force was based on an "accepted" principle. Russia
certainly did not agree, and the principle is found nowhere in the U.N.
Charter. After the fact, an independent international commission
12 4
concluded that NATO's use of force was "illegal, yet legitimate.'
Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General, commented:
To those for whom the Kosovo action heralded a new era when States and
groups of States can take military action outside the established mechanisms
for enforcing international law, one might ask: is there not a danger of such
interventions undermining the imperfect, yet resilient, security system created
after the Second World War, and of setting dangerous precedents for future
interventions without a clear criterion125to decide who might invoke these
precedents, and in what circumstances?
Despite the ambiguities regarding the legality of NATO's use of

"'

S.C. Res. 1199 (Sept. 23, 1998).

119DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 1154.
120
Id.
121Id.
122 Id.
123DAMROSCH & MURPHY, supra note 24, at 1155.
124INDEP.

INT'L

COMM'N

ON

KOSOVO,

THE

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED 186 (2000).

KOSOVO

REPORT:

CONFLICT,

125U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th plen. mtg., UN Doc. A/54/PV.4 (Sept. 20, 1999).
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force against Serbia, this use of force has given rise to a possible third
exception to the prohibition of use of force: Use of force is now arguably
legal to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. This exception was discussed
in a legal memorandum dated March 7, 2003, from British AttorneyGeneral Goldsmith to Prime Minister Tony Blair in the build-up to the
invasion of Iraq in 2003.126 In that memorandum, Goldsmith identifies
three bases for the legal use of force: "(a) self-defence (which may
to avert
(b) exceptionally,
self-defence);
include collective
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe; and (c) authorization by the
27
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter."'
Goldsmith goes on to observe that subpart (b) "has been emerging as a
further, and exceptional, basis for the use of force. It was relied on by
for the
the UK in the Kosovo crisis and is the underlying justification
28
No-Fly Zones. The doctrine remains controversial, however."'
Since then, there has been discussion in diplomatic circles about
State responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.' 29 The responsibility to
protect has not risen to the level of binding international law; it is merely
aspirational at this time.' 30 If it ever becomes accepted as law, however,
it will only have effect so long as a State possesses the power to enforce
it against the violators. This is why naval power matters.
The bombing of Kosovo confirmed the advantage of naval power
over land-based attacking options. In 2001, the General Accounting
Office 3 ' ("GAO") published a review of the operational challenges in
conducting the campaign.' 32 The GAO made several recommendations
addressing a variety of operational challenges that emerged during the
campaign. The challenges related to issues such as: (a) "working with
126Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Goldsmith on Iraq Resolution 1441 to
Prime Minister
Blair (Mar. 7, 2003), available at http://downingstreetmemo.com/docs/goldsmithlegal.pdf
127

id.

128

id.

129See, e.g., G.A. Res. 60/1

138-40 (Oct. 24, 2005); U.N. Secretary General,
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, 11, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009); see
also Mehrdad Payandeh, Note, With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept
of the Responsibility to Protect Within the Process of InternationalLawmaking, 35 YALE J.
INT'L 0L. 469 (2010).
13 See id. at 514.
131In 2004, the General Accounting Office was renamed to the Government
Accountability Office. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-271, § 8, 118
Stat. 811,814 (2004).
132 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-461, KOSOVO AIR OPERATIONS:
COMBAT AIRCRAFT BASING PLANS ARE NEEDED IN ADVANCE OF FUTURE CONFLICTS

(2001), availableat http://www.gao.gov/assets/240/231723.pdf.
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the host countries and U.S. embassies to obtain permission to base
aircraft in specific locations;" (b) "conducting extensive site visits to
determine what improvements must be made to foreign airfields and
arranging for the improvements to be completed;" (c) "ensuring that
U.S. aircraft have adequate ramp space, hangars, and fuel;" and (d)
"obtaining all the logistics services necessary to sustain and house the
personnel who will be deployed at foreign airfields."' 33 The use of naval
aircraft carriers does not raise these issues. The aircraft carriers sail in
international waters, and may engage in operations without the logistical
challenges faced by land-based aircraft. Naval power provides flexibility
and independence that is not provided by other military branches. Crises
(humanitarian, or otherwise) may occur anywhere, and only a naval
power has the ability to respond without raising additional complications
of territorial sovereignty and cooperation by other states.
A more recent example of the U.S. Navy's ability to address
humanitarian crises occurred in 2014. That summer, thousands of
Yazidis were trapped on Mt. Sinjar in Iraq by Islamic State of Iraq and
the Levant (ISIL) forces, who sought to kill or enslave the Yazidis.1 34 In
133 Id. at

7.

134Press Briefing, Department of Defense, Rear Adm. Kirby in Pentagon Briefing Room
(Aug.
14,
2014),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptlD=5486.
As you know, yesterday, we announced that a team of U.S. military personnel
accompanied by USAID conducted an assessment on the situation on Mount Sinjar
and the impact of U.S. military actions to date. The team assessed that there are far
fewer Yazidis trapped on Mount Sinjar than previously feared, and that's largely

because of our successful humanitarian air drops and U.S. airstrikes on ISIL targets.
These are the kinds of missions, as you know, that the military trains for all the
time and we do it better than anybody else.
These efforts enabled the Peshmerga to assist thousands of Yazidis in
evacuating from the mountain each night over the last several days. Those who
remain on Mount Sinjar are in better condition than we previously thought they
might be, and they continue to have access to the food and water that we have
airdropped. And as you may know, we did yet another airdrop last night.
The secretary is very proud that we've been able to effect this kind of change
around Mount Sinjar, and in particular thanks to the skill and professionalism of
our military personnel.
While this assessment has led us to conclude that an evacuation mission is far
less likely, we're not taking our eye off the ball with respect to the humanitarian
crisis in Iraq. We continue to assess the needs of the Yazidi people, as well as
others who have been displaced in northern Iraq. We will conduct additional
humanitarian airdrops, if needed, and we appreciate the assistance of the British,
the French, and other countries, as well as our interagency partners, working with
us to provide assistance to the Iraqi people.
Meanwhile, as Secretary Hagel reiterated last night, the situation in Iraq
remains dangerous and our efforts there are not over. The president has been clear
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response to the threats posed by ISIL, the United States engaged in
of 47
airstrikes against ISIL. The strikes were initiated by the launching
35
missiles from U.S. warships operating in international waters.'
Though it may seem that discussion of military power, including
naval power, is somehow inconsistent with human rights, the opposite
may be true. Events like genocide and ethnic cleansing are violent
exercises of power by those with power over those without. If human
rights law is to advance to the point where it becomes universally (or, at
least, widely) accepted that use of force is lawful in order to address or
avert such grave violations of international law, enforcement will depend
on states with the willingness and capability to stop or remedy such
violations. The states with the greatest capacity to do so will be the ones
with dominating naval power.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Naval power has played a key role in the development of CIL, and
will no doubt continue to do so. It may also play a role in the
advancement of human rights (though its primary purpose will always
remain defense and projection of force). The purpose of this article,
however, is not to extol the unquestioned virtue of naval power or to
assert that it always plays a positive, beneficial role in international law.
Indeed, the discussion would be incomplete without an examination of
the role of naval power in violating laws or norms. Professor O'Connell
acknowledged this fact: "But navies can play the part of the criminals as
well as of maritime regional crime squads, and it is sometimes difficult
to know which of the two roles they are in fact playing.... 36
about our limited military objectives in Iraq. They are, one, to protect American

citizens and facilities; two, to provide advice and assistance to Iraqi forces as they
battle ISIL; and, three, to join with international partners to address the
humanitarian crisis.
U.S. military remains ready to conduct-or continue, I'm sorry, airstrikes to
protect U.S. personnel and facilities in and around Erbil and to protect the Yazidi
people. However, while our airstrikes and our humanitarian aid have had an impact
on the situation in northern Iraq, there is still no American military solution to the
larger crisis in Iraq. The only lasting solution is for the Iraqis to come together and

form an inclusive government that represents the legitimate interests of all Iraqi
citizens and unifies the country in its fight against ISIL.
Id.

135Press Release, U.S. Central Command Public Affairs, U.S. Military, Partner Nations

Conduct Airstrikes Against ISIL in Syria (Sept.
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story-id=83476.
136
O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 1.

23,

2014),

available
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One example of the (mis)use of naval power was displayed by the
Royal Navy (the most powerful navy in the world at the time) in the
First Opium War in 1839 to 1842. 3 ' At that time, British traders
imported large amounts of opium into China, generating large-scale
profits for the traders and widespread addiction in the Chinese
population. 138 Alarmed by the rates of addiction, the Chinese emperor
attempted to restrict the import of opium. 139 China's attempt to suppress
the import of opium by British traders triggered a massive response by
the Royal Navy. Britain's response "introduced 'gunboat diplomacy' to
Asia in raw and undiluted form.' 140 After a few early battles in 1839 and
14 1
early 1840, Britain dispatched a fleet to wage war on China.
"The fleet consisted of 48 ships-16 warships mounting 540 guns,
four armed steamers, 27 transports and a troop ship ... .,,142 China's
attempt to shut down the opium trade was forcefully defeated. The Royal
Navy was the instrument to promote and maintain unrestricted drug
trade by the Western powers, particularly Britain.
Another example of the failure of naval power in matters of
international law also involved the Royal Navy and its relationship to the
slave trade. Britain outlawed the British slave trade in 1807.143 Prior 44
to
1807, however, the Royal Navy was itself involved in the slave trade.1
It had its own enslaved Africans in parts of the Caribbean, and escorted
slave ships down the African coast. 145 Up to three million Africans were
transported in British ships from 1650 to 1807, and at the end of the 18th
century Britain dominated the slave trade, with an average of more than
150 slave ships leaving English ports each year.146 Britain was the preeminent slave trading nation during the 18th century, and illegal British
slave trading continued after 1807.147 Prior to 1807, all of this was done,
of course, under the protection of the Royal Navy. Even after Britain
137Peter

C. Perdue, The First Opium War: The Anglo-Chinese War of 1839-1842,

VISUALIZING CULTURES AT THE MASSACHUSETTS

INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (2010),

http://ocw.mit.edu/ans7870/21f/21f.027/opiumwars_01/owl
138Id. at 2-4.

essay.pdf.

139

Id. at 11.
'40Id. at 31.
141Perdue,

supra note 137, at 32-35.
at 35.
143Huw Lewis-Jones, The Royal Navy and the Battle to End Slavery,
BRITISH
BROADCASTING
CORP.
(Feb.
17,
2011),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/royalnavy article01 .shtml.
141Id.

144Id.
145 id.
14 6

id.
147Lewis-Jones, supra note 143.
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made slave trading illegal, a quarter of all Africans who were enslaved
from 1500 to 1870 were transported across the Atlantic
in the period
4
after 1807.1 1
After 1807, the Royal Navy began patrols of the African coast in an
attempt to stop the slave trade.
The Royal Navy began an anti-slavery patrol in 1808 following Britain's
decision to abolish its slave trade in 1807. In 1819, the Navy created a naval
station in West Africa, an independent command under a Commodore (prior to
this the ships were on "particular service").
Between 1808 and 1860, the Royal Navy, West Africa Squadron seized
approximately 1600 ships involved in the slave trade and freed 150,000
Africans who were aboard these vessels.
Although the Royal Navy is estimated to have captured no more than 10
percent of the ships involved in the slave trade, the consistent role of the West
Africa Squadron can be argued to have exerted considerable pressure on the
nations that continued to trade in slaves after 1807.
There were few benefits to serving on the West Africa squadron. Daily life
was tedious, there were little chances of promotion and disease was common.
The dangers of the coastal climate were exacerbated by the operational
necessity of the men traveling through rivers and swamps in boats, and many
unsuited to
suffered from fevers. Moreover, the ships of the
49 squadron were
their task and often easily out-run by the slavers.'

Britannia ruled the waves, yet its ships were outrun by the slave
traders, and the trade remained robust.150 So how was it that the most
powerful navy in the world was powerless to stop the slave trade?
Perhaps the Royal Navy was unable to commit sufficient resources to
the task due to its conflicts with other European powers and the newly
freed colonies in America, or perhaps it was unwilling. Why did the
slave trade remain so active after 1807? Why was the Royal Navy
insufficiently equipped to deter the slave trade in a meaningful way?
Why did the Royal Navy provide so little career incentive to its officers
to combat the trade? Whatever the situation may have been, the Royal
Navy was unable or unwilling to devote maximum effort to ending the
slave trade, notwithstanding Britain's abolition.
148 id.

149Chasing Freedom Information Sheet, THE NAT'L MUSEUM OF THE ROYAL NAVY,

http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/visit-see victory-cfexhibition-infosheet.htm
[https://web.archive.org/web/20141205004459/http://www.royalnavalmuseum.org/visit-see-v
(last visited Oct. 3, 2015).
ictory-efexhibition_infosheet.htm]
50
1 See Lewis-Jones, supra note 143 ("Patrolling the coast was arduous, unpleasant and
frustrating, and the vessels employed on the station were often too old, too slow, and too few
in number to catch the slave ships.").
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These are two examples where naval power was used to engage in
efforts that would be considered illegal today (the Opium Wars) or
where there was less than full commitment-and perhaps a lack of
enthusiasm-to stop illegal activity (the slave trade). Like anything else,
naval power may be misused to promote illegal activity or it may be
used to develop and promote beneficial international law. On a more
positive and hopeful note, the United States Navy recognizes its role to
uphold international law:
U.S. naval forces constitute a key and unique element of our national
military capability. The mobility of forces operating at sea combined with the
versatility of naval force composition-from units operating individually to
multicarrier strike group formations-provide the President and the Secretary
of Defense with the flexibility to tailor U.S. military presence as circumstances
may require.
Naval presence, whether as a showing of the flag during port visits or as
forces deployed in response to contingencies or crises, can be tailored to exert
the precise influence best suited to U.S. interests. Depending on the magnitude
and immediacy of the problem, naval forces may be positioned near areas of
potential discord as a show of force or as a symbolic expression of support and
concern. Unlike land-based forces, naval forces may be so employed without
political entanglement and without the necessity of seeking littoral nation
consent. So long as they remain in international waters and international
airspace, U.S. warships and military aircraft enjoy the full spectrum of high
seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, including the right to conduct
naval maneuvers, subject only to the requirement to observe international
standards of safety, [and] to recognize the rights of other ships and aircraft that
may be encountered .... Deployment of a carrierstrike group into the vicinity
of areas of tension and augmentation of U.S. navalforces to deter interference
with U.S. commercial shipping in an area of armed conflict provide graphic
illustrations of the use of U.S. naval forces in peacetime
to deter violations of
151
internationallaw and to protect U.S. flag shipping.

15' NWP

I-14M, supra note 65, at 4-3 (emphasis added). NWP I-14M states its purpose

as:
This publication is intended for the use of operational commanders and supporting
staff elements at all levels of command. It is designed to provide officers in
command and their staffs with an overview of the rules of law governing naval
operations in peacetime and during armed conflict. The explanations and
descriptions in this publication are intended to enable the naval commander and his
staff to comprehend more fully the legal foundations upon which the orders issued
to them by higher authority are premised and to understand better the commander's
responsibilities under international and domestic law to execute his mission within
that law.
Id. at 19.
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Given the historical and continuing role of naval power in
developing and influencing customary international law, this role merits
a place in the study of international law. Naval power possesses the
potential to advance international law in positive ways, but it can also be
misused. If it is to be employed to achieve aspirational goals,
policymakers must first be aware of its role and why that role is so
important. This is why any student of international law should take naval
power into account.

